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Abstract : This study aims to investigate the extent of corporate governance reporting 
practices in the Indonesian banking sector. Specifically, it seeks to address whether 
firm-specific characteristics and sharia identity determine the extent of voluntary 
corporate governance disclosures. The finding shows that larger companies and ones 
with a higher level of debt tend to provide greater disclosure of corporate governance 
information. However, higher profitability, as well as sharia identity, do not seem to 
provide a higher level of disclosure compared to the conventional ones. These findings 
lead to an interesting question of whether sharia identity matters in the corporate 
governance disclosure of banking industry. 
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Abstract : Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui sejauh mana praktik pelaporan 
corporate governance di sektor perbankan Indonesia. Secara studi ini menguji apakah 
karakteristik spesifik perusahaan dan identitas syariah menentukan tingkat 
pengungkapan tata kelola perusahaan secara sukarela. Temuan menunjukkan bahwa 
perusahaan besar dan perusahaan dengan tingkat utang yang lebih tinggi cenderung 
memberikan pengungkapan yang lebih besar atas informasi tata kelola perusahaan. 
Namun, profitabilitas yang lebih tinggi, serta identitas syariah, tampaknya tidak 
memberikan tingkat pengungkapan yang lebih tinggi dibandingkan dengan yang 
konvensional. Temuan ini mengarah pada pertanyaan menarik tentang apakah 
identitas syariah penting dalam pengungkapan tata kelola perusahaan industri 
perbankan. 
 
Keyword : Perbankan Syariah, Keterbukaan Informasi, Tata Kelola Perusahaan, 
Indonesia.
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1.  Introduction 
The number of corporate frauds and shenanigans scandals may signal their poor 
governance, for example, financial statement frauds and fictitious securities by Bank 
Global, overstatement of financial statements by PT Kimia Farma, and creation of 
double statements. Furthermore, the crisis that occurred in Indonesia in 1997, 
according to Good Corporate Governance (GCG) General Guidelines (KNKG), was 
not caused by an economic crisis alone, but also due to poor implementations of good 
corporate governance.  Moreover, the economic crises such as the one in 1997 also 
damaged almost all of the companies in Indonesia. Companies were not the only ones 
to suffer; the world of banking also felt the impacts. Poor corporate governance is 
observable through the poor bank performances and lack of information transparency 
from management to stakeholders. As a result, one highlighted development in the 
banking sector is corporate governance. In the last few years, corporate governance 
has gained the attention of many individuals, such as academicians, investors, and 
other interested parties. This relates to increasing risks, both financial and 
nonfinancial, that is being faced in the banking sector. Therefore, managements’ 
initiative in providing information about governance to stakeholders is needed. 
The government’s response to developments in corporate governance is the 
formation of Komite Nasional Kebijakan Corporate Governance (KNKCG), through 
Keputusan Menko Ekuin Nomor: KEP/31/M.EKUIN/08/1999, which also laid out the 
first Good Corporate Governance (GCG) guidelines. On November 2004, KNKCG 
was changed to Komite Nasional Kebijakan Governance (KNKG) through Keputusan 
Menko Bidang Perekonomian Nomor: KEP/49/M.EKON/11/2004, which also served 
to perfect the existing GCG General Guidelines. The GCG Guidelines was not a 
regulation but contained the foundation for businesses that want to preserve their 
operations in the long run, with the initiative of the companies themselves. Therefore, 
to avoid asymmetric information with the public, the companies must willingly report 
the implementation of GCG in their annual reports. This is consistent with Chapter 7 
of KNKG's GCG General Guidelines regarding the implementation of GCG 
Guidelines.  
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According to the law, each bank, may it be conventional or sharia, are required to 
follow GCG principles. This duty for sharia banks is stipulated in UU RI No. 21 the 
Year 2008 about Syariah Banking, and subsequently, in Peraturan Bank Indonesia 
Nomor 11/33/PBI/2009 about the Implementation of Good Corporate Governance 
Umumfor Syariah Banking Meanwhile, the implementation of GCG for conventional 
banks is regulated under Peraturan Bank Indonesia Nomor 8/4/PBI/2006. In each of 
these regulations, banks are required to prepare statements regarding the 
implementation of GCG by disclosing several indicators that show that a company has 
implemented GCG. The duty of conventional banks to implement GCG is set out in 
Peraturan Bank Indonesia Nomor 8/4/PBI/2006 Pasal 61 ayat 2 dan 3, while for 
sharia banks, in Peraturan Bank Indonesia Nomor 11/33/PBI/2009 Pasal 62 ayat 2 
dan 3. 
In previous research, Adiono & Sholihin (2014) has analyzed corporate 
governance disclosure in the annual reports of sharia banks in Indonesia using 
indicators from PBI No 11/33/PBI/2009. This research shows the level of corporate 
governance disclosure of sharia banks as mandated by Bank Indonesia. The finding 
indicates that, out of nine sharia banks, Bank Syariah Mandiri, Bank BCA Syariah, 
and Bank Muamalat has the highest disclosure ratings, while Bank Bukopin achieved 
the highest average. With the development of corporate governance disclosures in 
Indonesia, the factors affecting corporate governance information disclosure is 
becoming an increasingly important topic to study. Previous researches have not 
studied corporate governance disclosure in companies by voluntary disclosures, and 
also have not investigated the factors that affect a company to disclose their 
information. Therefore, unlike previous studies, this research aims to study corporate 
governance disclosure from the voluntary aspect and the factors that affect it, such as 
profitability, leverage, and firm size, as well as to widen the population to sharia banks 
but also conventional banks. Research on voluntary disclosure is done by comparing 
disclosure indicators of corporate governance implementation suggested by GCG 
General Guidelines from KNKG, but not mandated by PBI for each type of bank. In 
other words, the indicators that have not been included in PBI, but are recommended 
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by GCG General Guidelines, are the indicators of voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure. Based on this background, this study aims to examine the extent of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure on the annual reports of banks in Indonesia 
and to test whether profitability, leverage and firm size affect the extent of voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure on the annual reports of banks in Indonesia.  
The results of this research are expected to add knowledge to the field of 
accounting, particularly on the extent of voluntary corporate governance disclosure 
and the effect of profitability, leverage and firm size on the extent of voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure on the annual reports of banks in Indonesia. The 
finding is also expected to contribute to the community; by providing a model of a 
banking corporation that is indeed aware of transparency of corporate governance, and 
thus can be a considering factor in choosing products and services that they will use. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Signalling Theory 
Disclosure of financial and non-financial information can provide a good or bad 
signal towards its users. Therefore, signaling theory is a theory that states how 
companies must send their signals towards the users of their annual reports. This 
signal can be information stating that their company is better than the others. The 
disclosure of information as a signal can be used to reduce information asymmetry. 
According to Wolk, Dodd, and Rozycki (2013), signaling theory explains how 
companies have incentives to report voluntarily to the capital market, even though no 
rules are mandating such disclosures. This incentive to provide information to outside 
parties is done in an attempt to reduce information asymmetry with outside parties. 
Internal parties have access to more information compared to the outside parties. 
Therefore, it would protect them if they valued the company less. Thus, to increase the 
value of the company, the company can reduce information asymmetry with its 
outside parties. The disclosure of voluntary private information to outside parties, as 
the users of the information, can reflect credibility of the company and reduce the 
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uncertainty of the users of the information with regards to the prospects of the 
company. 
 
2.2 Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency relationship as a contractual 
relationship showing that the principal or the shareholders delegate their authority of 
decision making to the agent or manager. In this relationship, there is a chance that the 
manager does not act in the interest of the principal. As a result, a potential conflict 
arises between the two. This conflict of interest also creates agency cost. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) define agency cost as the sum of the cost incurred by the principal to 
monitor, costs incurred by the agent for bonding, as well as residual loss. Monitoring 
cost that is committed by the principal is used to monitor the actions of the agent, 
which includes costs for an audit function, a control system, budget limitations and the 
formulation of a compensation scheme. Bonding cost that is incurred by the manager 
guarantees that the agent will not act in the way that will create a loss for the principal. 
A residual loss is a decline in the principal's wealth arising from the difference 
between the decisions made by the agent and the decisions to maximize the principal's 
wealth. Therefore, it can be concluded that the principal or the shareholder delegates 
the authority to the management to act on behalf of the principal as well as authority in 
making decisions. 
 
2.3 Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure (VCGD) 
Disclosure on annual reports can be divided into two: mandatory disclosure and 
voluntary disclosure. Mandatory disclosure is the disclosure of information that is 
required by a capital market regulation. Voluntary disclosure is the disclosure of 
information beyond that which is mandated, whether accounting information or other 
information that is considered relevant to the needs of the users of annual reports 
(Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995). Disclosure of corporate governance information 
shows that the company has implemented corporate governance or those that are 
lacking from this implementation, along with the reasons why. Indonesia has good 
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corporate governance guidelines produced by KNKG in 2001, which was revised in 
2006. These guidelines were provided for all companies Indonesia, may they be 
conventional or sharia. These GCG guidelines were not produced to act as a 
mandating regulation, but to contain principles that can be implemented by companies 
in the corridor of business ethics that applies and conduct good corporate governance 
on their own will. Similar to what is regulated by Peraturan Bank Indonesia, GCG 
guidelines also provide fundamental principles for companies to disclose corporate 
governance practices in the company. In chapter 7 of the Indonesian GCG guidelines, 
Statement on the Implementation of GCG Guideline is discussed. Every company 
should create a statement on the conformity of their GCG implementation with the 
GCG guidelines in their annual reports. Chapter 7 also explains that in this statement, 
the company must include reports on the structure and mechanism of the company's 
organs and other relevant information. The company must disclose this report in their 
corporate governance implementation report, which is included in the annual report. 
Items that must be reported can be used as indicators of corporate governance 
disclosure on annual reports (Attachment 1). The reporting of corporate governance 
implementation according to GCG guidelines is voluntary in nature, in other words, 
relies entirely on management initiative. 
However, during the last couple of years, in the law for both conventional and 
sharia banks, the implementation of GCG has been made mandatory. This mandating 
is stipulated in UU RI Nomor 21 Tahun 2008 on Syariah Banking and subsequently in 
Peraturan Bank Indonesia No 11/33/PBI/2009 on the Implementation of Good 
Corporate Governance for Syariah Banks and Syariah Units. Meanwhile, the 
implementation of GCG for commercial banks such as conventional banks is regulated 
by Peraturan Bank Indonesia No 8/4/PBI/2006. With the existence of these two 
Indonesian Banks Regulations both conventional and sharia banks bear the 
requirements to disclose information on the implementation of corporate governance 
on a corporate governance report. Pasal 61 ayat two dan 3 Peraturan Bank Indonesia 
No 8/4/PBI/2006 explains that information that must be disclosed on the corporate 
governance report by the conventional banks (Attachment 2). The disclosure of these 
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twelve indicators is mandatory. Consequently, if a corporate governance report 
discloses information other than these indicators, then this information can be 
considered voluntary. 
Apart from conventional banks, the burden of mandatory corporate governance 
reporting also lies on sharia banks. This is stipulated in Pasal 62 ayat 2 dan 3 
Peraturan Bank Indonesia No 11/33/PBI/2009. These points explain the information 
items that are mandatory to be disclosed in sharia banks corporate governance reports 
(Attachment 3), which includes fifteen indicators. Consequently, if a corporate 
governance report discloses information other than these indicators, the excess can be 
considered voluntary. 
According to the indicators based on KNKG’s GCG guidelines, Peraturan Bank 
Indonesia No 8/4/PBI/2006 and Peraturan Bank Indonesia No 11/33/PBI/2009, it can 
be concluded that the indicators show mandatory as well as voluntary corporate 
governance disclosures. Sharia and commercial banks disclosing their corporate 
governance practices in their reports, using the indicators in conformity with 
Peraturan Bank Indonesia show that they have fulfilled their mandatory corporate 
governance disclosure. Meanwhile, the parameter of voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure can be seen from the comparison between the indicators based on GCG 
general guidelines and Peraturan Bank Indonesia of each bank. If, when compared, 
there are indicators reported that are recommended by the GCG general guidelines but 
not mandated by the Peraturan Bank Indonesia, these disclosures can be considered 
voluntary. Table 2.1 below shows the indicators that are mandated by the GCG 
general guidelines to be reported on the corporate governance reports but are not 
regulated under PBI for sharia or conventional banks, thus can be used as indicators of 
the banks' voluntary corporate governance disclosure. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1  
Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure Indicators 
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No Disclosure Items 
1 Names of commissioners and their positions 
2 Number of attendances of each board of commissioner member in meetings 
3 Mechanism and criteria for self-assessment 
4 Name of each member of each committee 
5 Function and mechanism of each committee 
6 Number of meetings conducted by each committee 
7 Number of attendances of each committee member in meetings 
8 Mechanism and criteria for committee performance measurement 
9 Names of directors with their positions 
10 Functions of directors based on their positions 
11 Short description of the directors’ mechanism 
12 Number of meetings conducted by the board of directors 
13 Number of attendances of each director in meetings 
14 Mechanism and criteria for performance measurement of each director 
15 Vision, mission and company values 
16 Extraordinary events experienced by the company that can affect performance 
  
Source: GCG General Guidelines by KNKG (2006) 
 
 
2.4 Factors Affecting VCGD 
In their research, Natalia and Zulaikha (2012) analyse factors that affect corporate 
governance disclosure in annual reports. In this research, the presence of an 
independent audit committee affects corporate governance disclosure significantly. 
Meanwhile, other factors such as firm size, profitability and leverage show the 
insignificant effect on corporate governance disclosure. A different argument is 
brought by Karim and Ahmed (2005), expressing that firm size and profitability have 
a significant impact on the extent of disclosure. Based on the above, this research will 
study the effect of profitability, leverage and firm size on voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure. 
 
2.4.1 Effect of Profitability on VCGD 
Profitability affects disclosure in several ways (Karim and Ahmed, 2005). Natalia 
and Zulaikha (2012) state that profitability has an adverse but insignificant effect on 
corporate governance in annual reports. The same argument has also been delivered by 
Hossain and Hammami (2009), stating that company profitability correlates 
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insignificantly with the extent of voluntary information disclosure. Unlike the 
previous two types of research, however, Singhvi and Desai (1971) express that 
companies with earning margins higher will have an incentive to disclose more 
information to its investors. Furthermore, Singhvi and Desai (1971) also study the 
correlation between profitability and voluntary disclosure. Here, profitability is 
measured using the rate of return. Companies with high rates of return tend to disclose 
information that is more detailed to support the maintenance of the company's position 
and compensation. Meanwhile, companies with lower rates of return will disclose less 
information to conceal their reasons, such as losses or decreases in profit. In this 
research, profitability is measured by using return on equity (ROE). Based on the 
above, the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
H1: Profitability has a positive effect on voluntary corporate governance disclosure. 
 
2.4.2 Effect of Leverage on VCGD 
Natalia and Zulaikha (2012) find that leverage does not have a significant effect on 
corporate governance disclosure. Bujaki and McConomy (2002) state that companies 
with higher leverage will disclose more information compared to other companies. 
Consistent with agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), companies with higher 
leverage will increase monitoring costs, thus increasing management disclosure. A 
similar argument has been delivered by Muhammad, Shahimi, Yahya and Mahzan 
(2009), who state that there is a positive and significant correlation between leverage 
and the extent of corporate governance disclosure. In their research, Muhamad et al. 
(2006) measure leverage by using debt to equity ratio (DER). Based on the above, the 
following hypothesis can be formulated: 
H2: Leverage has a positive effect on voluntary corporate governance disclosure. 
 
 
 
2.4.3  Effect of Firm Size on VCGD 
The effect of firm size on disclosure has been much researched. Maingot and 
Zenghal (2008) find a positive correlation between firm size and corporate governance 
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disclosure. Maingot and Zenghal show that banks with larger sizes tend to disclose a 
full extent of corporate governance disclosure, compared to smaller companies. In this 
research, firm size is measured by the total asset owned by the banks. A similar 
argument is also raised by Sayogo (2006), who finds that there is a positive correlation 
between firm size and the level of corporate governance disclosure. Based on the 
above, the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
H3: Firm size has a positive effect on voluntary corporate governance disclosure.  
 
2.4.4  Effect of Sharia-Identity on VCGD 
Concerning financial statement preparation, Islam is more influential in the 
disclosure practice than in the measurement, mostly due to the similarity between the 
measurement concept in Islamic and conventional accounting systems. There are two 
basic concepts of the disclosure in Islamic accounting, namely the social 
accountability concept and the full disclosure concept (Baydoun and Willet, 1997, 
2000; Haniffa, 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2002). According to the social 
accountability concept, man has a role as khalifah or God's trustees in the world. 
Hence, a man should be accountable for all of his actions to God in the hereafter 
(Baydoun and Willet, 1997; Maali et al., 2006). Thus, man as a trustee has to be 
accountable to the community, environment, and society where he lives (Baydoun and 
Willet, 1997) wherein information disclosure serves as a channel to disseminate the 
accountability. According to the full disclosure concept, society has the right to know 
about companies' significant activities and operations (Baydoun and Willet, 1997; 
Maali et al., 2006). Such information enables society to measure the impact of 
companies' activities and operations on society.  Thus, consistent with this notion, 
Alam (1998) highlights that the conservatism principle in companies' disclosure is 
futile in Islamic accounting. Following the concept of the full disclosure above, it is 
expected that the annual reports of sharia banks provide a more transparent voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure. The full disclosure of relevant and reliable 
information is warranted to facilitate companies’ management in discharging their 
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accountability to the society and to guide external users in making economic and 
religious decisions (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2002). Therefore:  
H4: Sharia bank provides greater voluntary corporate governance disclosure than 
conventional ones. 
 
2.5  Framework 
The framework shows the effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable. The independent variable in this research is profitability, leverage, and firm 
size, while the control variable is the dummy publication year of the annual report. 
The dependent variable in this research is voluntary corporate governance disclosure. 
The following is the framework in this research: 
Figure 2.1  
Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Sample 
The population used in this research are all conventional and sharia banks 
registered in Bank Indonesia during the period 2011-2013. The choice of banks as the 
research object is based on the fact that banks are one of the financial institutions that 
influence the conditions of the economy, not only nationally but also internationally. 
The sample of this research is all the banks registered in Bank Indonesia. Sampling 
is conducted through purposive sampling, which is based on the aims of the study. The 
sample needs to fulfill the following criteria: (1) is a conventional or sharia bank 
registered in Bank Indonesia in 2013; (2) does not undergo a merger or acquisition 
during the research period (2011-2013); (3) publishes an annual report during the 
-Independent Variable 
- Profitability 
- Leverage 
- Firm size 
- Sharia bank 
 
Control Group 
- Period of Annual Report 
 
Dependent Variable 
Voluntary Corporate 
Governance Disclosure 
(VCGD) 
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research period (2011-2013) that is downloadable via www.idx.co.id or on the 
respective bank’s website; (4) reports its financial performance in Rupiah; (5) is not 
registered as BPD or Foreign Bank; and (6) reports positive profit and equity during 
the research period. 
 
3.2 Research Variable 
In this research, several variables are used, including independent variable, 
dependent variable, and control variable. The explanation for each of these variables is 
as follows:  
3.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this research is voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure. Indonesia has good corporate governance practices contained within the 
GCG guidelines formulated by KNKG. These guidelines are directed towards every 
company in Indonesia, both conventional and sharia, which does not mandate but 
recommend the implementation in the company. These guidelines explain which items 
must be disclosed in good corporate governance reports. In Peraturan Bank Indonesia 
(PBI), banks, both conventional and sharia, are required to create good corporate 
governance reports. Governance implementation for commercial banks is stipulated in 
Peraturan Bank Indonesia No. 8/4 / PBI / 2006, while the governance practices of 
sharia banks and sharia business units are regulated in Peraturan Bank Indonesia No. 
11/33 / PBI / 2009. For each bank, PBI explains what things are required to be 
disclosed in good corporate governance reports. Based on the indicators from the 
KNKG general guidelines, Peraturan Bank Indonesia No. 8/4 / PBI / 2006 and No. 
11/33 / PBI / 2009, a comparison can be made for the indicators that are recommended 
by KNKG but are not yet mandated by PBI of each bank. Measurement of voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure of banks is conducted using a checklist of items to be 
indicators that are compulsory and should be disclosed in the report on the 
implementation of good corporate governance in the annual report. Sharia banks and 
conventional banks that have revealed the implementation of corporate governance 
information in the report with indicators that exceed those required by Peraturan Bank 
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Indonesia shows that the bank has been doing voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure. The parameter of voluntary disclosure of corporate governance can be seen 
from a comparison of indicators based on the general guidelines and PBI of each bank, 
therefore is constructed into voluntary corporate governance disclosure score 
(VCGD). Referring to the research Haniffa and Cooke (2002) in Darmadi (2013), a 
score of 1 is given if the indicator is disclosed and a score of 0 if the indicator is not 
disclosed. The formula then calculates the index:  
 
 
 
 In the formula, nj indicates the number of items or indicators that are expected 
to be disclosed by banks and Xij is equal to 1 if the item is disclosed. So the score 
VCGD will have a minimum value of 0.00 and a maximum value of 1.00. Based on 
the above, the author will measure the voluntary corporate governance disclosure by 
calculating a score of voluntary corporate governance disclosure (VCGD) using the 
formula used by Haniffa and Cooke (2002). 
 
3.2.2 Independent Variable 
The independent variables are variables that affect the dependent variable or the 
bounded variable. The independent variables are profitability, leverage, firm size, and 
sharia bank. In previous studies, Natalia and Zulaikha (2012) use ROE (Return on 
Equity) to proxy profitability that is measured by comparing the net income by total 
equity. Meanwhile, to measure leverage, Natalia and Zulaikha (2012) measure 
leverage with debt to equity ratio, which is the proportion of total debt to total equity. 
Meanwhile, firm size is proxied with total assets of the company (Natalia and 
Zulaikha, 2012). Based on earlier research, in measuring the three independent 
variables, this research will measure profitability by using return on equity (ROE), 
using the leverage of debt to equity ratio (DER) and the size of the company by using 
the natural logarithm of total assets; whereas a dummy variable measures sharia bank 
identity. 
 𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑗
𝑡−
𝑛𝑗
 VCGD = 
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3.2.3 Control Variable 
The control variables used in this study is the period of publication of the annual 
report, which is measured using dummy variables. The period of research used in this 
study is 2011-2013, with a dummy in 2011 and 2012. The company that publishes an 
annual report on the period will be given a score of 1, while the company that does not 
publish annual reports will be given a score of 0. 
 
3.3 Regression Analysis 
This study will use multiple regression analysis to measure the effect of 
profitability, leverage and firm size on voluntary corporate governance disclosure of 
conventional banks and sharia banks in their annual reports. The form model tested is 
as follows: 
 
VCGDi,t = β0+ β1PROFITi,t + β2LEVi,t + β3LNASETi,t + β4D_SHAi,t + 
β5D_2011 + β6D_2012 + εi,t 
 
where: 
VCGD : voluntary corporate governance disclosure index 
PROFIT: profitability as measured by ROE 
LEV : leverage as measured by debt to equity ratio 
LNASET: the size of the company measured by the natural logarithm of assets 
D_SHA: dummy Sharia company (1=Sharia bank; 0=otherwise) 
D_2011: dummy 2011 
D_2012: dummy 2012 
Ε : estimation error 
 
 
4. Findings 
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The population used in this study are all listed banks in Bank Indonesia. Sample 
selection is made by a purposive sampling method with predetermined criteria. The 
sampling process can be seen in Table 4.1 below: 
 
Table 4.1.  
Sample Selection 
 
No. Criteria N 
1 Registered banks in Bank Indonesia 2013 120 
2 Involve merger or acquisition during the research period (2011-2013) (5) 
3 Has a complete dataset 88 
4 Reports its financial performance in Rupiah 88 
5 Is not registered as BPD or Foreign Bank 66 
6 Reports positive profit and equity during the research period 59 
 Final Sample  59 
 
Samples were obtained as many as 59 banks of 120 banks that have been observed 
previously. The number of 120 is a combination of five types of banks registered in 
Bank Indonesia. These five types of banks are Limited Banks, Foreign Exchange and 
Non-Foreign Exchange Banks, Mixed Banks, BPD, and foreign banks. In the selection 
of the sample, the author did not enter BPD or foreign banks. It is because they do not 
have a component of corporate governance such as the board of directors in the 
company. BPD is directly supervised by the supervisory board, while the foreign 
banks do not have commissioners so that the entire activity of the company is led, 
directed and supervised by a board of directors. Thus, during the study period for three 
consecutive years then a sample of 177 was obtained. List of banks in the sample can 
be found in Appendix 4. 
 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
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The dependent variable in this study is voluntary corporate governance disclosure 
while the independent variable is profitability, leverage, and firm size. Table 4.2 
presents the results of descriptive statistics from data obtained as follows: 
 
Table 4.2  
Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Average Std. Deviation 
VCGD 177 0,19 0,94 0,66 0,17 
PROFIT 177 0,00 0,58 0,14 0,09 
LEV 177 0,48 15,62 6,68 3,15 
LNASET 177 0,08 13,51 9,37 2,24 
ASET* 177 1,00 733.099,76 68.644,42 134.247,77 
*in billions of rupiah 
 
Table 4.2 above shows that the average score of the voluntary disclosure of corporate 
banking governance in both sharia banks and conventional banks in Indonesia is 0.66, 
with a minimum value of 0.19 and a maximum value of 0.94. Banks that have the 
highest disclosure score in general banking is Bank Syariah Mandiri, Bank Panin 
Syariah BTN, Bank CIMB Niaga and BRI. While the Bank with the lowest score is 
the disclosure of Bank Mestika Dharma. Based on table 4.2 above, the average ratio of 
bank profitability, measured by ROE (Return on Equity) is approximately 14% with a 
minimum value of 0.004 or 0% and a maximum value of 58%. While the average bank 
leverage, measured by Debt to Equity Ratio (DER) in general amounted to 68.00%. 
The value of the minimum leverage ratio is 48%, and the maximum value is equal to 
15.62 or 1562%. The maximum value of DER is shown by Bank Artha Graha 
International, with total debt amounting to Rp18,031 billion, while total equity is 
amounting to Rp1,154 billion. Firm sizes display an average value of total assets 
amounting to 68,644.42 billion rupiahs (68.6 trillion), with a minimum value of 1 
billion and a maximum value of 733,099.76 billion (733 trillion).  
 
4.2 The Extent of Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure (VCGD) 
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Based on the Research Period 
The period of research is over three years, from 2011 to 2013. The following, 
Table 4.3, is on VCGD score based on the study period. 
Table 4.3  
The Average of Yearly VCGD  
 
 Minimum Maximum Average Std. Deviation 
2011 0,19 0,94 0,64 0,18 
2012 0,25 0,94 0,66 0,17 
2013 0,25 0,94 0,69 0,16 
 
Table 4.3 is the result of data processing of all banks in the research samples both 
sharia banks and conventional banks. Based on Table 4.3, it can be seen that the 
average level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure of banks assessed using 
VCGD score tends to increase from year to year. In 2011 the average disclosure was 
0.64 out of a perfect score of 1. In 2012, the average disclosures increased by 0.02 to 
0.66. While in 2013 the average disclosures increased by 0.03 to 0.69. Based on the 
table above, it can be seen that the maximum score of VCGD is relatively constant 
from year to year. The maximum score is still in the number of perfect scores of 0.94 
to 1. The minimum value increased in 2012 by 0.25 from the previous year 2011 
which has a minimum value of 0.19. Whereas in 2013 the minimum value remained 
constant from the previous year. The increases in average and the minimum score of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure from year to year indicates awareness of 
banks to disclose information on corporate governance voluntarily. 
 
Based on Type of Bank: Sharia and Conventional Banks 
The sample used in the study includes all banks that operate as both sharia banks 
and conventional banks. The following is Table 4.4 on the extent of VCGD based on 
the type of bank. 
 
 
Table 4.4  
The Extent of VCGD by Type of Bank 
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 Minimum Maximum Average Std. Deviation 
Sharia 0,31 0,94 0,65 0,18 
Conventional 0,19 0,94 0,67 0,17 
  
Based on Table 4.4 it can be seen that the average level of voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance as measured by the score VCGD show that there are differences 
in the average disclosure VCGD between conventional banks and sharia banks. Based 
on the above table, it can be seen that both types of banks have the same maximum 
value of 0.94 out of a perfect score of 1. The highest VCGD scores for the 
conventional bank are shown by BTN, Bank CIMB Niaga and BRI. While highest 
scores in VCGD of sharia banks come from Bank Syariah Mandiri, Bank Panin 
Syariah. Meanwhile, the lowest VCGD score of conventional banks is owned by Bank 
Mestika Dharma VCGD with a score of 0.19. While the lowest score of VCGD in 
sharia banks is shown by Bank Victoria Syariah, with a VCGD score of 0.31. 
 
Disclosures per Indicator of VCGD 
VCGD indicators used in this study consist of 16 items. Table 4.5 shows the 
percentage of disclosures per indicator for sharia banks and conventional banks. A 
comparison of the average disclosure can be seen in Figure 4.1. 
Table 4.5 shows that in conventional banks, the highest disclosures are in item 1 
(names of commissioners and their positions) and item 9 (names of directors and their 
positions), whereas the lowest disclosure is found in item 8 (mechanism and criteria 
for committee performance measurement). Meanwhile, for sharia banks, the highest 
disclosures are in items 1, 9 and 15 (vision, mission and company values) and the 
lowest percentage is in item 8 (mechanism and criteria for committee performance 
measurement), which is similar with the disclosure in conventional banks. Figure 4.1 
shows that on average, sharia banks provide more extensive information disclosure 
related to items 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 16. For item 2, 6, and 7, conventional 
banks disclose a more significant amount of information than sharia banks. As for 
items 1, 3, and 9, the two types of banks disclose the same amount of information. 
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Table 4.5  
The Extent of Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure  
 
No. Description 
CB 
(%) 
SB 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
1 Names of commissioners and their positions 100 100 100 
2 
Number of attendance of each board of commissioner 
member in meetings 
86 80 85 
3 Mechanism and criteria for self-assessment 13 13 14 
4 Name of each member of each committee 93 97 94 
5 Function and mechanism of each committee 93 97 93 
6 Number of meetings conducted by each committee 89 53 82 
7 
Number of attendance of each committee member in 
meetings 
71 37 65 
8 
Mechanism and criteria for committee performance 
measurement 
0 0 0 
9 Names of directors with their positions 100 100 100 
10 Functions of directors based on their positions 42 47 43 
11 Short description of the directors’ mechanism 85 90 85 
12 Number of meetings conducted by the board of directors 76 87 78 
13 Number of attendance of each director in meetings 73 73 73 
14 
Mechanism and criteria for performance measurement of 
each director 
24 27 24 
15 Vision, mission and company values 99 100 99 
16 
Extraordinary events experienced by the company that can 
affect performance 
23 33 25 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1  
Illustrative Comparison of VCGD Conventional and Shariah Banks 
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4.3 Data Preparation 
Normality testing of data was done using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Hair et al., 
2013). The normality test results show a significance value of 0,197. Thus it can be 
seen that the residual value in this study is typically distributed with significance 
values higher than 0.05. Multicollinearity testing shows that all independent variables 
and controls have tolerance values greater than 0.1 and has a VIF value less than 10. It 
can be concluded that the variables used in this study did not have serious 
multicollinearity problems. Testing heteroscedasticity was done with Glesjer test, 
indicating a problem of heteroscedasticity on LNASET variable because it has a 
significance value of less than 0.05 (Gujarati, 2004). Therefore, the testing was done 
with the approach of the White Robust Regression. Durbin-Watson autocorrelation 
tests show a value of 2.085 with the value du table for α = 5, and k (the number of 
independent variables) are 5 and sample number 177, the obtained values of 1.8124 
and a table dU dL value of 1.6964 and with a value (4-dU) of 2.1876. This shows that 
dw located between dU and (4-dU) is 1.8124 <2.085 <2.1876, which means that there 
is no autocorrelation in this study (Hair et al., 2013). 
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4.5 Hypothesis Testing 
This test is used to test the influence of all independent variables (profitability, 
leverage, and firm size) simultaneously on the dependent variable (voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure). Table 4.9 indicates that the calculated F value is 15,080 with a 
significance value of p ≤ 0,001. This suggests that significant value is smaller than the 
significance level (α) = 5, indicating that the regression model corresponds to the 
predictions made. 
Table 4.9  
Hypothesis Testing Results 
 
Hypothesis Variable Std. Coef. T P >│t│ 
 (Constant) 0,250 0,43 0,003 
H1 PROFIT 0,044 0,57 0,570 
H2 LEV 0,138 1,97 0,051 
H3 LNASET 0,514 6,46 0,000 
H4 D_SHA -0,007 -0,10 0,920 
 D_2011 -0,107 -1,51 0,134 
 D_2012 -0,062 -0,88 0,381 
 F-stat                                         16,640 
 Sig. (p.value)                                        < 0,001 
 Adj. R
2
                                             0,348 
 
Table 4.9 above shows that Adjusted R
2 is 0.348 (F = 16.640, p≤0,001). Concerning 
the first hypothesis (H1), the result shows that there is no significant positive 
association between the profitability and voluntary corporate governance disclosure. 
Thus, H1 is not supported. This is consistent with the research of Hossain and 
Hammami (2009), which states that the company's profitability has no significant 
relationship to the voluntary disclosure. Regarding H2, Table 4.9 shows that leverage 
has a positive effect on voluntary corporate governance disclosure. The finding 
supports H2 as leverage, measured by Debt to Equity Ratio (DER) has a value of the 
coefficient of 0.008 with a significance level of 0.024 which is smaller than the 
significance level (α) = 0.05. This suggests that leverage has a significant effect on 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure. This is consistent with research Bujaki and 
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McConomy (2002) and Mohammed et al. (2009) which find a positive and significant 
correlation between leverage and the level of corporate governance disclosure. 
Companies with high leverage tend to disclose more comprehensive information on 
corporate governance. 
According to Table 4.9, H3, which states that firm size affects the company's 
voluntary disclosure of corporate governance positively, is supported because there is 
a significant positive association between firm size and VCGD. Based on t-test table 
above can be seen that the variable firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of 
assets (LNASET) has a coefficient value of 0.040 with a significance level of 0.000, 
which is smaller than the significance level (α) = 0.05. This shows that the size of the 
company has a significant positive effect on voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure. This is consistent with the research of Maingot and Zenghal (2008) and 
Sayogo (2006), which state that firm size and disclosure of corporate governance has a 
positive relationship. Lastly, H4 is not supported as there is no significant positive 
association between sharia bank and VCGD. Thus, sharia banks in this study do not 
seem to provide greater voluntary corporate governance disclosure compared to 
conventional banks.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This study aims to determine the extent of voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure in annual reports of banks in Indonesia and examines the effect of 
profitability, leverage and firm size on voluntary corporate governance disclosure in 
annual reports of banks in Indonesia based on indicators of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure of KNKG. Based on the research described in Chapter IV of the 
analysis and discussion, it can be concluded that the banks that have the highest scores 
of voluntary corporate governance disclosure, in general, is the Bank Syariah Mandiri, 
Bank Panin Syariah, BTN, Bank CIMB Niaga and BRI with VCGD score of 0.94. 
Meanwhile, from the study period, the company's voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure increases from year to year with the increase in VCGD score of 0.02 in 
2012 and 0.03 in 2013. As for the type of banking, it is shown that there are 
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differences in the average level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure between 
conventional banks and sharia banks by 0.02 and likely to be insignificant. Disclosure 
with the highest percentage of 100 in conventional banks is found in items No. 1 and 
9, while the sharia banks are found in items No. 1, 9 and 15. The items are an indicator 
to reveal the name of commissioners and their positions, names of the directors and 
their positions, as well as the vision, mission, and values of the company. Whereas 
items with the lowest disclosure are items, No. 8 is an indicator to reveal the 
mechanisms and criteria for performance assessment committee.  
Based on the analysis and discussion of the translation, it can be concluded that the 
variables do not significantly affect the profitability of voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure. Meanwhile, the variable leverage has a significant positive effect on 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure. This is consistent with agency theory, 
which states that companies with higher leverage will increase the cost of monitoring 
that will make the management increase the level of disclosure. The variable firm size 
concludes that there is the significant positive effect on voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure. This is following the signaling theory, which states that the 
company will provide a signal indicating that the company is better compared to other 
companies. Banks with large firm sizes will tend to disclose broader information on 
corporate governance compared to the banks with smaller sizes. 
 
6. Limitations 
This study has some limitations. First, it focuses only on the banking industry in 
Indonesia. Therefore, the effect of institutional factors in a country's corporate 
governance disclosure are not examined. Subsequent research may undertake a cross-
country approach to capture the institutional factors, to provide insight for the 
improvement of the transparency of disclosure of corporate governance in the banking 
industry. Second, this research covers the 3-years study period. Further research can 
extend the period of study to increase the generalizability of the results. 
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Attachment 1 
GCG Implementation Indicators 
Based on KNKG’s General Guidelines 
1 Structure and mechanism of the board of commissioners include: 
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A 
Name of the commissioner and the status of Independent Commissioner or Non-independent 
Commissioner 
B 
Number of meetings conducted by the Board of Commissioners, with the number of 
attendance of each member 
C Mechanism and criteria for self-assessment of the performance of each commissioner 
D 
An explanation of the commissioners’ supporting committees, including: 
(i)  name of each of the committee members;  
(ii)  description of the function and mechanism of each committee; 
(iii) number of meetings conducted by each committee with the number of attendance;  
(iv)  mechanism and criteria for committee performance measurement 
2 Structure and mechanism of the Board of Directors, including: 
 
A Name of the directors and their positions and functions 
B 
A brief description of the mechanism of the directors, including the decision-making 
mechanism as well as a delegation of authority  
C 
Number of meetings attended by the directors, with the number of attendance of each 
director 
D Mechanism and criteria for the directors’ performance measurement 
E 
A statement on the effectiveness of the internal control system that includes risk 
management as well as monitoring and internal audit system 
3 Other relevant information relating to the implementation of GCG that needs to be disclosed in 
the GCG report includes: 
 
A Vision, mission and company values 
B Majority shareholder 
C Policy and remuneration amount of commissioners and directors 
D Transactions with parties that have a conflict of interest 
E Assessment results of the implementation of GCG as reported on the AGM 
F Extraordinary events experienced by the company that can affect the performance 
Source: KNKG’s General Guidelines (2006) 
 
 
Attachment 2 
GCG Implementation Indicators 
Based on PBI No 8/4/PBI/2006 
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a 
Coverage of Good Corporate Governance as referred to in Article 2 paragraph (2) and the results 
of the assessment (self-assessment) on the implementation of Good Corporate Governance in 
banks 
b 
Share ownership Board of Commissioners as well as the financial relationship and family 
relationship with members of the Board of Commissioners Board of Commissioners, Board of 
Directors and/or shareholders of the Bank as referred to in Article 17 
c 
Share ownership Board of Directors and financial relationship and family relationship with a 
member of the Board of Directors member Board of Commissioners, members of the Board of 
Directors and/or shareholders of the Bank as referred to in Article 36 
d 
Remuneration package/policy and other facilities for the Board of Commissioners and Board of 
Directors 
e Shares owned option of Commissioners, Directors and Executive Officers; 
f The ratio of highest and lowest wages 
g The frequency of meetings of commissioners as mentioned in Article 15 
h Internal frauds occurring and bank’s  attempt to resolve them 
i Number of legal disputes and the bank's attempt to resolve them 
j Transactions containing conflict of interest 
k Buyback shares and/or buy back bank securities 
l 
The allocation of funds for social activities and political activities, both in nominal and 
beneficiary 
Source: Peraturan Bank Indonesia No 8/4/PBI/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attachment 3 
GCG Implementation Indicators 
Based on PBI No 11/33/PBI/2009 
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A 
The general conclusion from the results of self-assessment of the implementation of GCG 
BUS 
B 
Share ownership Board of Commissioners, financial relations and family relations BoC 
members with the controlling shareholders, members of the Board of Commissioners 
and/or members of the Board of Directors SCB and another position in the company or 
other entities referred to in Article 16 
C 
Share ownership Board of Directors and financial relationship and family relationship 
members of the Board of Directors with the controlling shareholders, members of the 
Board of Commissioners and/or other members of the Board of Directors as referred to in 
Article 32; 
D 
Dual position as a member of the Sharia Supervisory Board on other Sharia financial 
institutions as referred to in Article 50 
E List of consultants, advisors or equivalent was used by SCB referred to in Article 27 
F 
Remuneration policy and other facilities (remuneration package) for the Board of 
Commissioners, Directors, and Sharia Supervisory Board as referred to in Article 17 
paragraph (3), Article 33 paragraph (3) and Article 51 paragraph (3) (at least include the 
number of members of the Board of Commissioners , the number of members of the Board 
of Directors, the number of members of the Sharia Supervisory Board as well as the total 
amount of wages, benefits (benefits), compensation in the form of stock, and other forms 
of remuneration specified facilities General Meeting of Shareholders) 
G The ratio of highest and lowest wages 
H 
The frequency of meetings of the Board of Commissioners as referred to in Article 14 
paragraph (1) 
I 
The frequency of meetings of the Sharia Supervisory Board as referred to in Article 49 
paragraph (1) 
J Internal frauds occurring and SCB attempt to resolve 
K Number of legal disputes, both civil and criminal, and SCB attempt to resolve 
L Transactions containing conflict of interest 
M Buyback shares and/or buy back SCB securities 
N Disbursement of funds for social activities of both the number and the recipient of funds 
O Non-halal revenues and their uses 
Source: Peraturan Bank Indonesia No 11/33/PBI/2009 
 
Attachment 4 
LIST OF COMPANIES 
Lestari and Barokah 
 
93 
 
No Bank Name Bank Type 
1.  PT BANK SYARIAH MANDIRI 
FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
2.  PT BANK BNI SYARIAH 
FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
3.  PT BANK BCA SYARIAH 
NON-FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
4.  PT BANK BRI SYARIAH 
NON-FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
5.  PT BANK MEGA SYARIAH 
FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
6.  PT BANK PANIN SYARIAH 
NON-FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
7.  PT BANK VICTORIA SYARIAH 
NON-FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
8.  PT BANK SYARIAH BUKOPIN 
NON-FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
9.  PT BANK MAYBANK SYARIAH INDONESIA MIXED BANK 
10.  PT BANK MUAMALAT INDONESIA 
FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
11.  PT BANK NEGARA INDONESIA (PERSERO) TBK LIMITED BANK 
12.  
PT BANK RAKYAT INDONESIA (PERSERO), 
TBK. 
LIMITED BANK 
13.  PT BANK TABUNGAN NEGARA (PERSERO) LIMITED BANK 
14.  PT. BANK MANDIRI (PERSERO), TBK. LIMITED BANK 
15.  PT BANK ANTARDAERAH DEVISA NSCB 
16.  
PT BANK ARTHA GRAHA INTERNASIONAL, 
Tbk. 
DEVISA NSCB 
17.  PT BANK BUKOPIN, Tbk DEVISA NSCB 
18.  PT BANK BUMI ARTA, Tbk DEVISA NSCB 
19.  PT BANK CENTRAL ASIA Tbk. DEVISA NSCB 
20.  PT BANK CIMB NIAGA, Tbk DEVISA NSCB 
21.  PT BANK DANAMON INDONESIA Tbk DEVISA NSCB 
22.  PT BANK EKONOMI RAHARJA, Tbk DEVISA NSCB 
23.  PT BANK GANESHA DEVISA NSCB 
24.  PT BANK HANA DEVISA NSCB 
25.  PT BANK HIMPUNAN SAUDARA 1906, Tbk DEVISA NSCB 
26.  PT BANK ICBC INDONESIA DEVISA NSCB 
27.  PT BANK INDEX SELINDO DEVISA NSCB 
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28.  PT BANK INTERNASIONAL INDONESIA Tbk DEVISA NSCB 
29.  PT BANK MASPION INDONESIA DEVISA NSCB 
30.  PT BANK MAYAPADA INTERNATIONAL Tbk DEVISA NSCB 
31.  PT BANK MEGA, Tbk DEVISA NSCB 
32.  PT BANK MESTIKA DHARMA DEVISA NSCB 
33.  PT BANK NUSANTARA PARAHYANGAN, Tbk DEVISA NSCB 
34.  PT BANK OCBC NISP, Tbk DEVISA NSCB 
35.  PT BANK PERMATA Tbk DEVISA NSCB 
36.  
PT BANK RAKYAT INDONESIA AGRONIAGA, 
TBK. 
DEVISA NSCB 
37.  PT BANK SBI INDONESIA DEVISA NSCB 
38.  PT BANK SINARMAS, Tbk DEVISA NSCB 
39.  PT BANK UOB INDONESIA  DEVISA NSCB 
40.  PT PAN INDONESIA BANK, Tbk DEVISA NSCB 
41.  PT BANK ARTOS INDONESIA 
NON-FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
42.  PT BANK FAMA INTERNASIONAL 
NON-FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
43.  PT BANK MAYORA 
NON-FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
44.  PT BANK MITRANIAGA 
NON-FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
45.  PT BANK MULTIARTA SENTOSA 
NON-FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
46.  PT BANK NATIONALNOBU 
NON-FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
47.  PT BANK SAHABAT SAMPOERNA 
NON-FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
48.  PT BANK SINAR HARAPAN BALI 
NON-FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
49.  
PT BANK TABUNGAN PENSIUNAN NASIONAL, 
Tbk 
NON-FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
50.  PT BANK VICTORIA INTERNATIONAL, Tbk 
NON-FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
51.  PT BANK YUDHA BHAKTI 
NON-FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
52.  PT PRIMA MASTER BANK 
NON-FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE BANK 
53.  PT BANK COMMONWEALTH MIXED BANK 
54.  PT BANK BNP PARIBAS INDONESIA MIXED BANK 
55.  PT BANK CAPITAL INDONESIA, Tbk MIXED BANK 
56.  
PT BANK RABOBANK INTERNATIONAL 
INDONESIA 
MIXED BANK 
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57.  PT BANK RESONA PERDANIA MIXED BANK 
58.  
PT BANK WINDU KENTJANA INTERNATIONAL, 
Tbk 
MIXED BANK 
59.  PT. BANK SUMITOMO MITSUI INDONESIA MIXED BANK 
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